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The efficacy of the unemployment compensation titles of the Social Security Act1
is dependent upon the adoption by the states of legislation providing for such com-
pensation, which will meet the standards prescribed by the federal statute.2 Either
in anticipation of, or as a result of, the Federal Act, nine states and the District of
Columbia have passed legislation for this purpose.3 With the enactment of similar
bills in other states, 4 the constitutional questions which they pose will become of
nationwide importance. This note is concerned with the principal constitutional
objections which will probably be raised to the state unemployment compensation
acts which already have been or may be enacted in the near future. (The constitu-
tionality of the Federal Act will be considered in the succeeding issue of this period-
ical.) Thus far, no state or federal court has passed on the validity of an unemploy-
ment compensation act. Judicial appraisal of the acts concerning matters peculiar
to state constitutions will be in the hands of the highest tribunals of the several
states. For final authority as to matters which involve rights guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution we must await the decision of the United States Supreme Court.
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'Act of Aug. 14, 1935, Public, No. 275, 74 th Cong., Ist Sess., tit. III, IX, 42 U. S. C. A. §§3os-1305.
'Employers throughout the United States subject to the Act are required to pay a payroll tax, effective
January 1, 1936. Id., tit. IX, §goi. To encourage and assist the states to pass unemployment compensa-
tion laws, it is provided that the taxpayer may credit against the federal tax contributions made under
approved state laws, up to go% of the federal assessment. Id., §902. In addition, $4,000,000 is appro-
priated for the fiscal year ending 1936, and $49,000,000 each succeeding year, to be apportioned among the
states having approved laws for administration expenses. Id., tit. III, §301.
3 The following laws have thus far been enacted: Alabama, Laws 1935, Sen. B. No. 395; Callornia,
Stat. 1935, c. 352; District of Columbia, Public, No. 386, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935); Massachusetts,
GEN. LAws, c. 151A (Laws 1935, c. 479); New Hampshire, Laws 1935, c. 99, as amended by c. 142;
New York, CoNSOL. LAws, c. 31, art. 18, §§500-531 (Laws 1935, c. 468); Oregon, Laws 1935, Spec. Sess.,
H. B. No. 71; Utah, Laws 1935, c. 38; Washington, Laws 1935, c. 145; Wisconsin, WVss. STAT. (1933) c.
io8, as amended by Laws 1935, c. 192, 272, 446.
A brief act was passed by North Carolina, Laws 1935, C. 492, which purports to authorize the Governor
and Council of the State to set up a system of unemployment compensation "in the event of the enactment
by the United States Congress of Unemployment Insurance Laws." No such system has in fact been set
up under this act, and it will not be considered in this note.
'For a record of pending state bills, see C. C. H. UNEMP. INS. SERVcE, 7021-7022.
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AIM CONTRIBUTIONS TAXES?
It is fairly safe to assume that the attack on the acts will be directed at the
requirement that contributions be made by employers (and in some states employees)
for the support of the compensation systems. The judicial approach will doubtless
be first to determine whether the contributions are to be categorized as taxes or as
exactions incidental to a scheme of regulation. If they are found to be taxes, various
specific state constitutional provisions will be encountered, as well as the requirement
that the levy be for a "public purpose," the due process, equal protection, and priv-
ileges and immunities clauses of the Federal Constitution. If, on the other hand,
they are classified as regulatory devices, the principal problems will impinge upon the
due process clause, with consideration also of the equal protection and privileges and
immunities clauses. There will naturally be some degree of overlapping between the
state and federal constitutions, in which case the federal construction should prevail.
All of the state statutes which have been enacted are compulsory," but they are
not entirely uniform in character,6 A number of employments are excepted from
each act.7 Otherwise, the general provision is that any employer who employs for a
specified period of time within a year a specified number of persons or more, the
"greater part" of whose work is done within the particular jurisdiction, is subject to
its provisions." Employers within the acts are required to contribute a certain per-
centage of the total wages paid.9 Some of the acts, however, exempt employers who
have established adequately secured guaranties of employment.10 Six provide for
employee contributions as well." Seven2 follow the so-called "Ohio Plan,"' 3 and
pool the contributions in a central fund. From this fund compensation is paid out
to temporarily unemployed persons without regard to how much or little their
"Their compulsion lies in the requirement of contribution to unemployment compensation funds.
True, some states allow employers to be exempted if they provide approved private compensation plans,
see note io, infra, yet this does not remove the element of compulsion, but only provides an alternative
method.
' Detailed studies of the state acts are to be found elsewhere in this symposium. For their texts, see
C. C. H. UNEMP. INS. SERVICE; PRENmcE-HALL LABOR LAW AND UNEMP. INS. SERVICE.
'The state acts usually follow the exemptions of the Federal Act, §907 (c), with minor variations.
'The Federal Act taxes employers of eight or more, and five states follow this provision. Four states
cover employers of four or more; the District of Columbia, of one or more. In indicating the territorial
limits of coverage, California, District of Columbia, New Hampshire and Wisconsin acts have provisions in
the language quoted above.
'The rate of contribution varies among the different states, beginning on a low scale for 1936, and
ascending to the maximum during 1938 and thereafter, following, with some deviations, the ascending
scale of the federal tax. Thus, the Alabama statute requires the employer to contribute .9% of the payroll
during 1936, x.8% during 1937, and 2.7% during 1938 and thereafter. The District of Columbia requires
employers subject to the act to pay r% of the payroll into the fund in 1936, 2% in 1937, 3% for 1938-
1940, with a maximum during and after 1941 of 4%, and a minimum of 1.5%.
"California, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. The former two also exempt employers operating under
other types of approved plans.
Alabama, California, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Washington.
Alabama, California, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Wash-
ington.
' See Rubinow, State Pool Plans and Merit Rating, supra, p. 65.
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particular employer has paid into it. On the other hand, three of the statutes14 are
patterned after the "Wisconsin Plan,"'" providing for separate reserve accounts for
each employer-his employees being paid entirely out of his accumulated fund. With
the exception of New York,-6 every statute contains a system of "merit rating,"
which permits reductions in the amount of contributions, on the basis of contribution
and benefit experience over a certain period of time.' A minimum contribution
rate is set by most of the acts.' 8 In accord with one of the requirements of the Social
Security Act, the acts provide that the contributions are to be deposited to the credit
of the depositing state with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.' 0
Administration is in the hands of boards or commissions already existent, or specially
created for the purposes 2 °
. Are the compulsory contributions likely to be construed as taxes?2' The term
"tax" has no well-defined meaning. Cooley's broad definition--"Taxes are the en-
forced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the state by
virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government and for all public
needs." 2 2-is of little help, for at least three other classes of governmental exactions
have been distinguished.23 There is the "fee," which is an exaction for a special
service rendered.24 A "penalty" is an enforced governmental contribution, which is
designed to act as a deterrent to, or a punishment for, the commission of certain
socially-undesirable acts. 25 Finally, there is the "expropriation of money from one
" Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin. Although following the employer reserve plan, Utah permits the
administrative commission to compel pooling of funds in certain localities and industries.
See Brandeis, The Employer Reserve Type of Unemployment Compensation Law, supra, p. 54.
"Its act directs an advisory council to study the feasibility of a merit-rating plan.
'
7Briefly, the system of merit rating is designed to equate as far as is practicable the amount of uncm-
ployment suffered in a particular employer's business with the amount of contributions made into the
compensation fund. It will also serve to encourage the employer to keep his employment record as good
as possible. See Rubinow, supra note 13, at pp. 79-86.
' Wisconsin, however, allows contributions to cease if the individual employer's reserves reach io%
of his total payroll.
"Social Security Act, §903 (a) (3). This provision promises to cause difficulties in states with con-
stitutional provisions governing the deposit of state funds.
,' See Cook, The Bodies Administering Unemployment Compensation Laws, supra, p. 95.
'It was tacitly assumed in a recent article that the contributions are excise taxes. See Epstein and
Malisoff, Some Constitutional Obstacles to Unemployment Insurance (s935) 9 SoctiA Sncum',, No. 9,
p. 3. The Attorney General of Oregon in an opinion rendered on the constitutionality of the Oregon
statute indicated this as a possible objection. C. H. H. UNEMP. INs. SERIweE, 40-013-40,014.
a1 CooLEY, TAxATioN (4 th ed. 1924) §I.
'The "special assessment," an exaction laid upon property levied according to the benefit conferred
thereon, might also be distinguished. See id. §31.
' A common example is a sum assessed to pay the expenses of litigation, or for the filing and record-
ing of certificates of capital stock. See id. §33; SELiGoAN, EssAYs ON Tt.xAmoN (soth ed. 193) 407-413.
' The Child Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.) 259 U. S. 20 (1922), is a classic
example of a penalty in the guise of a tax. An act of Congress subjected employers of children in man-
ufacturing establishments, etc., to an "excise tax equivalent to ten per centum of the entire net profits
received or accrued for such year from the sale or disposition of the product' of such establishment, except-
ing employers acting under mistake and without intent to evade the tax. In holding the act to impose
a penalty, Chief Justice Taft said: "Scienter is associated with penalties, not with taxes. . . . In the light
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group for the benefit of another . . . to effectuate regulation of a matter in which
both groups are interested, and in respect of which there is a power of legislative
regulation."20  Obviously, the differentiation, between the conventional "tax," and
the exaction of the third class, is difficult to draw. In an effort to determine the status
of the contributions, resort must be had to analogies furnished by other types of
legislation.
(i) Compulsory contributions to state workmen's compensation funds furnish
perhaps the closest analogy.27  In very few cases in which the validity of the work-
men's compensation acts was considered were the exactions required looked upon
as taxes. In State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen28 the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington, upholding an act requiring contributions to a state fund, held the contribu-
tion a "license tax." In Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Co., the Iowa court
was willing to assume "for the sake of argument" that the law imposed a tax. 29
In a California case it was held that the provisions of an act requiring the dm-
ployer of a workman killed having no dependents to pay $35o into a state fund for
the promotion of vocational education and rehabilitation of workmen, is a "tax."30
And the exaction from employers in a Maryland act creating a miner's relief fund
was denominated a "tax."3'
Against these stands the whole array of decisions involving other workmen's com-
pensation acts in which it was not even suggested that the payments might be con-
sidered taxes. In Sayles v. Foley" the Rhode Island court dismissed as irrelevant
cases having to do with taxes. In a California case a judge denied that the act in-
volved a tax.33 The United States Supreme Court in a leading case34 explicitly
of these features of the act, a court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop the
employment of children within the age limits prescribed." Id. at 37.
Perhaps the latest example is U. S. v. Constantine, 56 Sup. Ct. 223 (1935), invalidating a prohibitive
federal "tax" on liquor dealers operating in violation of state laws.
"Quoting Mr. Justice Roberts' majority opinion in U. S. v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (936), holding
the Agricultural Adjustment Act processing tax invalid. He also said: "It is inaccurate and misleading
to speak of the exaction from processors ... as a tax.... A tax, in the general understanding of the term,
and as used in the Constitution, signifies an exacting for the support of the government." In Rickert Rice
Mills, Inc. v. Fontenot, decided Jan. 13, 1936, he further said of this tax: "The exaction [despite the
amendment of the Act] still lacks the quality of a true tax."
Both impose liability on the employer regardless of fault-one for compensation for injuries and
death suffered in the course of the employment; the other for injuries suffered from lack of employment.
Both seek to shift a risk to the business. Both impose new liabilities. And both look primarily to the
protection of the employee. This analogy has been suggested by current law review writers. See Legis.
(935) 35 CoL. L. Rav. 1262, 1266, n. 25; (1935) 4 Fose) L. REv. 485, 495-496; (i935) 10 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 147, 154-155. However, many of these acts permit employers to remain outside the state system,
subject to certain disabilities.
"6.5 Wash. 156, 17 Pac. 11o (igis).
175 Iowa 245, 297, 154 N. W. 1037, 1056 (1915).
" Yosemite Lumber Co. v. Ind. Accid. Comm., 187 Cal. 774, 204 Pac. 226 (1922).
'Am. Coal Co. v. Allegheny County, 128 Md. 564, 98 At. 143 (1916).
"238 R. L 484, 490, 96 Ad. 340, 343 (I916).
"Henshaw, J., dissenting (the majority had not suggested that the contributions were taxes). Western
Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 Pac. 398 (i915).
"Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 (1917).
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refused to consider whether the Washington act involved a tax or a regulation under
the state's police power. It is significant that in practically all workmen's compensa-
tion cases the acts are spoken of as an exercise of the police power rather than of the
taxing power.
(2) In Noble State Bank v. Haskell,35 the Supreme Court upheld an Oklahoma
statute which levied upon every bank in the state an assessment of a certain per-
centage of the deposits, for the purpose of creating a common guaranty fund. Mr.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the unanimous Court, said: "... . it would seem that
there may be other cases beside the every day one of taxation, in which the share
of each party in the benefit of a scheme of mutual protection is sufficient compensa-
tion for the correlative burden that it is compelled to assume. At least, if we have a
case within the reasonable exercise of the police power, as above explained, no more
need be said. '3 Those who attacked the act claimed that it was not an exercise of
the taxing power.
37
(3) Another analogy which should be of much persuasive force is the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in the Railroad Pension Case.38 An act of Congress
established a compulsory retirement and pension system for the employees of all
railroad carriers in interstate commerce. The fund for the pensions was to arise
from compulsory contributions from the carriers and their employees, to be deposited
in the United States Treasury. In holding the act unconstitutional as violative of
due process and beyond Congress' power to regulate commerce between the states,
the Court did not suggest that the contributions required might be classified as taxes.
Add to these precedents the fact that the acts are not in the form of revenue
measures, that merit rating is inconsistent with the ordinary notion of a tax, that the
funds are limited to the payment of benefit claims, and the probability is that the
contributions will be considered a regulatory "expropriation of money from one
group for the benefit of another," rather than taxes.89 Especially is this true of those
statutes embodying the employer reserves system.
X219 U. S. 104 (i915). This analogy was discussed in Legis. (1935) 4 Fosw. L. Rnv. 485, 496;
(1935) zo ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 147, 155.
W219 U. S. at xii.
'rId. at xo6.
' Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 55 Sup. Ct. 758 (1935).
'If the exaction imposed by Title IX of the Federal Act were held a tax (as it must be to fall within
the powers of Congress), this holding would not necessarily conflict with decisions holding the state
exactions to be regulatory. The federal statute takes the form and has more of the qualities of a revenue
measure, in that all the money collected goes into the general Treasury of the United States, and the
money advanced for administration of the state acts under Title III is a certain sum bearing no direct rela-
tion to the money collected. Under the state laws, however, the money collected is immediately segregated
for compensation payments only and not for the general governmental revenue. Moreover, the exactions
under the state laws bear more of the earmarks of regulations, since the systems of merit rating are
designed, at least in part, to encourage the employers so to conduct their businesses that they will have
a good employment record. But ci. Social Security Act, §§9o9-9o.
Titles II and VIII of the Federal Act, establishing a national system of old-age insurance financed by
a "tax" on employers and employees, presents a closer analogy to the state unemployment compensation
laws in this respect than does Title IX.
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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IF CONTRIBUTIONS ARE HELD TAXES
Assuming, however, that the compulsory contributions will be considered to be
taxes, what constitutional objections will be encountered? There is the general re-
quirement, now under the wing of the due process clause, that taxes must be
expended for a public purpose.40 Although it is not at all clear what constitutes a
"public purpose," it is fairly predictable that, upon analogy to the workmen's com-
pensation acts, the expenditure of money for unemployment compensation meets
this test.41 It tends to stabilize purchasing power and to prevent indigency with its
consequent burden upon the public. On the other hand, it is true that benefits are
payable without regard to the need of the recipient; indeed, the basis of benefit pay-
ments is such that irregularity in employment diminishes the right to benefits, while
the claimant with a long record of uninterrupted employment behind him can, in
some states, secure extra benefits for that very reason. Yet, in view of the almost
universal prevalence of governmental unemployment compensation systems, a de-
cision denying that such systems in this country fell within the broad category of
"public purpose" would seem an anachronistic anomaly.
Other federal constitutional limitations do not jeopardize this legislation seriously.
The state acts do not seem to contravene the due process clause, unless the merit
rating provisions offend the due process clause by reason of defects in the procedure
adopted,42 or deny "equal protection of the laws" as a result of unreasonable clas-
sification.43 Certainly these statutes do not impair "the obligation of contracts." 44
Neither the "privileges and immunities" clause of Article IV, Section 2, forbidding
unreasonable discriminations by states against the citizens of other states 45 or the
"privileges or immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding the
abridgment of rights enjoyed by virtue of national citizenship 46 seem likely to present
problems unless, possibly, in the application of these acts to some interstate employ-
ment situations.
Provisions in state constitutions are more definite. It is quite common for them
to provide that taxation must be "uniform," or "uniform on the same class of sub-
"Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 2,7 (19r7); I COOLEY, TAXATION §174.
" Cooley says: "Workmen's compensation acts, if they be deemed to impose a tax, do so for a public
purpose .. " r COOLEY, TAXATION §212. In Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, supra note 34,
although it was not decided whether the contributions were taxes or regulations, it was held that the
workmen's compensation act there in question was for a public purpose. "This decision defies the
orthodox categories," it has been said in a leading article on this subject. "Whether this compulsory con-
tribution be called a tax or an imposition the most we can say is that it is unobjectionable under the
Fourteenth Amendment." McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation (I93O) 18 CALIF. L. REv. 137
, 
249.
Cl. Lewis & Clark County v. Ind. Accid. Board, 52 Mont. 6, 155 Pac. 268 (1916) (county tax levy to pay
compensation to injured county employees held for a public purpose).
'Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., i55 U. S. 70 (1884).
"But "the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to compel the state to adopt an iron rule of
equal taxation." Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237 (189o).
"Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 6o (19o5).
AS CooLEY, TXATioN §250.
"Colgate v. Harvey, 56 Sup. Ct. 252 (1935).
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jects. ' '47  Some states apply this requirement to all types of taxes.48  But by the
weight of authority it refers only to poll or property taxes.4 9 In the Clausen case,
supra, the Washington court said of the exaction under the workmen's compensation
act: "But it is manifest that it is not a 'tax' in the sense that the word is used in the
sections of the constitution to which reference is here made."50 And it held that
the uniformity provision applies to property taxation only. Cooley points out that
whether or not the uniformity provision applies to taxes other than property taxes is
of little practical significance: "If it does apply, the tax must be uniform on all per-
sons of the same class. If it does not apply, the legislatures may nevertheless classify
vocations and impose a tax of different amounts upon the different occupations."5 1
Since the exaction under the unemployment compensation acts is more in the nature
of an "occupation," "privilege," or "excise" tax, few, if any, states are likely to throw
out the "tax" on this ground. Difficulty, however, might be caused by merit rating
which leads to a classification within a class. This might prove fatal where the
uniformity requirement is held to apply to taxes other than those on property. But
there is respectable authority that a uniformity provision not only allows classifica-
tion, but also a progressive rate within the class.52 One court has stated that state
uniformity provisions are coincident with the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Federal Constitution.53
The typical merit-rating provision which allows the administrative board to
reduce contributions upon the basis of unemployment experience might be held
invalid as a delegation to a subordinate body of the legislative power to change rates
of taxation. However, the Tariff Act of 1922, which empowered the President to
increase or decrease the duties fixed by the act when they failed to equalize the
difference between foreign and domestic costs, was sustained in Hampton & Co. v.
United States.54 Also, in so far as merit rating operates to lower the existing rates,
the field for administrative discretion is broadened. Action by a tax official under a
statute which "grants the taxpayer the benefit of discretionary action" has been held
by the Supreme Court not subject to judicial review. 5  Upon familiar principles of
""See, e.g., Awz. CONsT. art. IX, §i; DEL. CONSr. art. VIII, § ; MICH. CONST. art. X, §3; OHIO CoNSr.
art XI, §2; VA. CONST. art. XIII, §168; see Eps'rm AND MALISOF, supra note 21, for a collection of
relevant state constitutional provisions.
"
8 United Cigar Stores v. Stewart, 114 Ga. 724, 87 S. E. 1034 (1916); In re Watson, 17 S. D. 486, 97
N. V. 463 (1903); Ex parte Jones, 38 Tex. Cr. 482, 43 S. V. 513 (1897).
'American Smelting & Refining Co. v. People, 204 U. S. 103 (1907); Chicago & N. W. R. v. State,
128 Vis. 533, io8 N. W. 557 (19o6); Note (93) 7V A. L. R. 256, 262; I COOLEY, TAXATION §253.
'°65 Wash. 156, 203; 117 Pac. ixos, 1118 (19x).
i COOLEY, TAXATION §269. See also In re Watson, supra note 48; c. Penna. v. Girard Life Ins. Co.,
305 Pa. 558, 158 Ad. 262 (1932).
'In re McKennan's Estate, 25 S. D. 369, 126 N. W. 611 (191o); 4f. Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S.
329 (1902).
'Penna. v. Girard Life Ins. Co., supra note 51.
5' 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
'Heiner v. Diamond Alkali Co., 288 U. S. 502 (1933).
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administrative law, those statutes which set the standards and terms upon which
contributions are to be regulated are on safer constitutional ground.56
It has been urged that if the contributions are called excises, they may be excluded
by some twenty-two state constitutions which enumerate the types of taxes which
may be levied, without including this particular type.57 There is no magic in the
name "excise," and whether the contributions will be so denominated under the
state constitutions is a matter of individual constitutional construction. But if the
constitution of a particular state will not permit the levying of this type of "tax,"
amendment would be essential.
As a consideration in favor of construing the contributions to be taxes, it is sub-
mitted that the "public purpose" for which money raised by taxation may be ex-
pended is broader than the "public welfare" which justifies regulation under the
police power. It seems clearer that a state can tax an employer (and employees) for
the support of the unemployed than that it can thus regulate the employer and his
private business for the same purpose. Professor McAllister has observed: "it is now
settled that a municipality may operate a coal yard. But does that make the business
of distributing fuel such a public one that private yards may be regulated as public
utilities or even may be granted the power of eminent domain? An affirmative
answer does not necessarily follow.""5 Moreover, the objections to the pooling of
contributions, discussed later, do not apply if contributions are classed as taxes.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IF CONTRIBUTIONS ARE HELD REGULATORY EXACTIONS
Regarded as part of a regulatory scheme, the contributions must meet the objec-
tion that they deprive employer and employee of liberty and property without due
process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. Just what limita-
tions the due process clause imposes on state legislation is a much mooted question.
Its application depends upon the facts of each particular case; its meaning is arrived
at by a process of "inclusion and exclusion."59  Professor Brown has deduced the
following formula: 0° (I) the object of the legislation must be permissible; (2) the
means must have a substantial relation to the end; (3) fundamental rights must not
be infringed; and (4) the law in question must not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or
oppressive. From the generality of these criteria it is apparent that the due process
clause becomes a "peg" upon which judges may hang their social, economic, and
political philosophies, sustaining or throwing out legislation which they believe un-
t "It may be laid down as a general proposition that where a legislature enacts a specific rule for fixing
a rate of taxation, by which rule the rate is mathematically deduced from facts and events occurring
within the year and created without reference to the matter of that rate, there is no abdication of the
legislative function, but, on the contrary, a direct legislative determination of the rate." Per Brewer, J.,
in Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Powers, 2oi U. S. 245, 297 (igo6).
"See Epstein and Malisoff, supra note 21.
' McAllister, supra note 41, at 253.
' See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 (1897).
'OBrown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court (i927) 40 HARv. L. REay. 943,
953.
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sound or unfair.6' And this despite the frequent assertion that questions of policy
are solely for legislative determination.
Whenever a regulatory statute of this character is attacked as violative of due
process, it is inevitably defended as an exercise of the "police power."0 2 This is'the
power which a state possesses to legislate for the public health, morals, safety, and
general welfare.68 The police power has been called the least limitable of all powers
of government;6 4 Holmes stated that it "extends to all great public needs." 5 Anyone
attacking a state statute is confronted by a presumption of constitutionality, with the
concomitant burden of proving invalidating facts.66
Supreme Court decisions bearing on the employment relation will indicate to
some degree the extent to which employer and employee may be constitutionally
deprived of "liberty" and "property." State statutes have been held valid which
abolished the fellow servant rule;67 established an eight hour day for mines and
smelters;08 forbade the cleaning of coal before weighing to determine the miner's
wage base; 69 required the assent of the employer and the employee's wife to a wage
assignment; 70 made employers absolutely liable for injury to children engaged in
extra-hazardous occupations; 71 required wages to be paid semi-monthly; 72 estab-
lished a compulsory workmen's compensation system.73 On the other hand the
limits are suggested by cases overthrowing statutes establishing a sixty-hour week
for bakeries;74 forbidding discharge of employees for labor union membership; 75
establishing compulsory arbitration for wage disputes;76 setting minimum wages for
women in various employments.77
The cases invalidating state statutes prescribing minimum wages for women in
various employments rested on the authority of Adkins v. Children's Hospital,78
which held invalid an act of Congress similarly setting minimum wages for the
District of Columbia. In the Adkins case (a 5-to-4 decision) the Court said: "It
compels him [the employer] to pay at least the sum fixed in any event, because the
' See Maggs, The Constitution and the Recovery Legislation: The Rdles of Document, Doctrine, and
7udges (r934) i U. oF Cm. L. Rav. 665, 666-674.
' See Cousens, The Constitutional Background of Unemployment Insurance (1934) 2o VA. L. REv.
497-
'Morr, DuE PRocEss Or LAw (1926) 300.
"Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 548 (1917); per McKenna, J.
'In Noble State Bank v. Haskell, supra note 35, at iii.
' O'Gorman and Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1935).
"Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205 (1888).
'Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898).
e'McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 53 (909).
""Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225 (1911).
7'Sturges Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320 (1913).
'Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685 (1914).
"Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, supra note 34.
7
'Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915).
' Chas: Wolff Packing Co. v. Kans. Ct. of Ind. Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (1923).
'Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U. S. 530 (1925); Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. CO., 273 U. S. 657 (1927).
726x U.S. 525 (1923).
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employee needs it, but requires no service of equivalent value from the employee....
To the extent that the sum fixed exceeds the services rendered, it amounts to a com-
pulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent person
for whose condition there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility, and therefore,
in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it belongs to anybody,
belongs to society as a whole. ' 70  Such language may sound menacing to any system
of unemployment compensation. But a possible ground of distinction is that the
unemployment compensation acts do not interfere with the right of the employer
and employee to bargain as to the wage scale. The social outlook manifested by the
Court, however, is ominous, especially since four members of the majority in the
Adkins case are still on the bench.8 0
The analogy between compulsory workmen's compensation acts and unemploy-
ment compensation acts has already been discussed.81 In upholding the former acts,
courts have recognized that accidents are foreseeable consequences of the employ-
ment relation, and that it is a reasonable exercise of the police power to shift the
losses to the business through the employer. Much the same can be said of the
latter acts. If a state can force the employer to provide for one type of loss, it seems
reasonable to assume that it can make him provide, at least to a limited degree, for
the other. Admittedly, however, the unemployment acts go farther than the work-
men's compensation statutes, in that the former impose an entirely new liability
where none existed. Still the latter do impose a substantial new burden when they
impose liability regardless of fault.8 2
The unemployment compensation acts go beyond the workmen's compensation
legislation in at least one more respect. Compensation for injuries, disease, or death
under the latter can be secured only if they arose out of the employment.83 As
defined by the cases, this means that there must be some causal connection between
the employment and the resultant injury.84 For this reason, it might be argued, it
is not unfair to place the cost on the employer. On the other hand, unemployment
is not caused by the employment nor usually by the employer, but largely by factors
beyond his control; and hence it is unfair to impose liability therefor on the em-
ployer.8 5 These arguments, however, are not without countervailing factors.
Though an injury is compensable only if it is caused by the employment, in a great
number of the cases the causes are beyond the employer's control, and he is made
to pay regardless of the precautions he has taken. It is true, to some extent at least,
that an employer can so conduct this business that accidental injuries incident thereto
"Id. at 557-558.
8' For a discussion of the adventitious circumstances as to the Court's personnel at the time the case
was decided, see Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation (1924) 37 HAtv. L. RaV. 545-552.
See pp. 141-143, supra.
See Hughes, C. J., dissenting in the Railroad Retirement Case, 55 Sup. Ct. at 777.
'Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418 (1923).
s'Ibid.
'This argument is advanced in Legis. (5935) 4 FoRD L. Ray. 384, 495.
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will be at a minimum. Likewise, to a lesser extent perhaps, he can so manage his
business that he can reduce the necessity of laying off workers to a minimum. In so
far as the latter is true, unemployment may be said to be caused by the employment.
Ultimately it thus becomes a matter of degree under the due process clause
whether the Supreme Court will consider the imposition of this novel burden too
arbitrary and capricious to stand the test of constitutionality.
Language in the majority opinion invalidating the recent Railroad Retirement
Act"8 may indicate that the provisions of those unemployment compensation statutes
which pool the contributions are violative of due process. The four dissenting
justices relied on, but the majority sought to distinguish, three leading cases in which
the pooling principle had been upheld. Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United
States,s" upholding legislation which required carriers to contribute part of their
excess earnings to a revolving fund to be used primarily for loans to carriers, was not
in point, said the Court, for that act had to be administered so as to leave each
carrier a reasonable return upon its property. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washing-
ton,88 sustaining a compulsory workmen's compensation act of the pooling type was
declared inapplicable, for it definitely provided that no class should be liable for the
depletion of the accident fund by reason of accidents happening in any other class
and thereby sought to equate the burden according to the risk. Noble State Bank v.
Haskell,9 holding valid an assessment on all state banks for the creation of a central
depositor's guaranty fund, was distinguished on the ground that it was supported
by an ulterior public advantage, and the fact that the share in a scheme of mutual
benefit is sufficient compensation for the taking. The Court then said: "We conclude
that the provisions of the [Railroad Retirement] act which disregard the private and
separate ownership of the several respondents, treat them all as a single employer,
and pool all their assets, regardless of their individual obligations and the varying
conditions found in their respective enterprises, cannot be justified as consistent with
due process."90
The ground of distinction taken in the Mountain Timber Co. case affords some
basis for sustaining the pooling principle as embodied in the unemployment com-
pensation statutes, since the system of merit rating takes into account the experience
of each employer's business, and seeks fairly to equate the contributions to the benefits
paid.91 A possible answer to this argument is that the merit-rating system represents
only a rough approximation to unemployment experience.9 2  Moreover, it does not
' Supra note 38.
"263 U. S. 456 (1924). MSupra note 34.
' Supra note 35. so 55 Sup. Ct. at 767.
'See Legis. (935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1262, at 1287 n. 122, in which the following pertinent language
of the Mountain Timber Co. case is quoted: "As further rebutting the suggestion that the imposition is
exorbitant or arbitrary, we should accept the declaration of intent that the fund shall ultimately become
neither more nor less self-supporting, and that the rates are subject to future adjustment by the legislature
and the classifications to rearrangement according to experience, as plain evidence of an intelligent effort
to limit the burden to the requirement of each industry." 243 U. S. at 221.
' See Rubinow, State Pool Plans and Merit Rating, supra, at pp. 83, 84.
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take effect until after three or more years, and hence the "arbitrary" feature persists
until that time. Yet the Court might well take into account that this interim is a
necessary feature of the rating system, and be lenient toward it. Obviously, the
acts containing the employer reserves feature present no difficulty on the score of
pooling. An employer cannot object that the amount of his contribution is affected
by the unemployment experience of other employers.
Another constitutional objection, which may be summarily disposed of, is that
the unemployment compensation acts deny the equal protection of the laws.93 This
familiar clause forbids unjust discrimination; it does not prohibit reasonable clas-
sification.94 The usual statement is that a classification is permissible provided it
proceeds on a difference which has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be
attained. 5  To be unconstitutional, the classification must produce an inequality
which is actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary."6 The fact that the
statute does not extend to all cases that it might possibly reach is no valid objection.97
It does not appear that confining the legislation to employers and employees for
the benefit of the unemployed is a palpably unreasonable classification. Nor is con-
fining it to employers of a certain number or more. It was never successfully urged
that equal protection was denied in the workmen's compensation cases, and no
different result is to be expected in the unemployment compensation cases. Again,
however, it should be noticed that this flexible clause permits the play of the indi-
vidual judges' social and economic philosophies. "Equal protection and due process
are handmaidens which help each other with their tasks. One may be doing less
only because the other is doing more. '98
It is to be expected that other constitutional obstacles to unemployment compen-
sation will be encountered when the courts come to pass upon its validity and, if the
systems run this initial gauntlet, again in the course of their administration. Limita-
tions of space have prevented any exhaustive treatment of the subject in this note.
Attempt has been made only to survey its salient features.
" U. S. CoNsr. AmEND. XIV.
"Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927); Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U. S. 370 (1924).
'Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, io5 (1899).
"Fidelity Mut. L. Assoc. v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308, 325 (1902).
' James-Dickinson Farm Mtge. Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119 (1927).
' See Powell, The Supreme Court and State Police Power, 1922-1930 (932) 18 VA. L. Rav. 597, 640.
